The numbers nobody publishes

That isn't covered in the materials I've been given, so I can't answer it. The parts I couldn't find are listed below.

1 — There is no single national charitable‑gaming total available from a primary source; this research therefore relies on state‑level filings for Minnesota, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Kentucky, and Maryland as of September 21, 2026 [1]. 2 — Tribal gaming is outside this research’s scope and is reported to the National Indian Gaming Commission under a separate framework [2]. 3 — The NIGC publishes annual gross gaming revenue only at aggregate regional levels, not by product type or operator, so tribal e‑tab or electronic bingo activity cannot be isolated for integration with state charitable‑gaming filings [2]. 4 — Where states operate e‑tabs but do not publish granular electronic breakouts, this research does not substitute an estimate; those gaps remain unfilled in any roll‑up built from filings [2]. 5 — National figures that appear in trade press typically combine measured state filings with extrapolations or with tribal figures reported under a different framework, which are not included in the figures described in this session [1]. 6 — Gaming Market Research labels derived numbers as estimates and does not present them as filed figures, to keep measured and constructed components distinct in any national total [3].

November 25, 2025 is the key date: Polymarket’s US entity (QCX LLC) received a CFTC Amended Order of Designation then, and US operations thereafter show up via CFTC designations and enforcement records rather than routine revenue line items [1][2]. December 3, 2025 is when Polymarket relaunched for US customers under that designation, reinforcing that CFTC‑tied materials are jurisdiction‑bounded status documents (e.g., press releases, orders, dockets) rather than platform‑wide trading totals [2][3]. Platform volumes, by contrast, are Polymarket’s own disclosures that cover its global activity, including substantial offshore trading predating US licensing, and are not mandatory CFTC filings [1]. In practice, the CFTC sources are press releases, DCM application records, and court dockets, while revenue figures come from platform disclosures or financial‑press reporting, not from CFTC filings themselves [3]. Cadence also differs: the regulatory picture changes on days‑to‑weeks timelines, so trackers update weekly and date entries, whereas platform volume figures can appear more rapidly but mix US and non‑US activity, reducing comparability to US‑regulated disclosures [4][1].

3 cadences — annual (Minnesota), quarterly (Indiana), and monthly (New Hampshire) — mean the as‑of periods do not align, limiting direct period‑over‑period comparisons across states [1]. Because only final audited figures are used when an agency publishes both an estimate and a final, trend series adopt each agency’s publication cycle rather than a unified timeline [1]. 1 national total — there is no single national charitable gaming total from primary sources — so multi‑state trendlines must be assembled jurisdiction by jurisdiction from filed data [2]. States that do not publish e‑tab breakouts, lack centralized reporting, or publish only license lists are excluded rather than estimated, creating gaps in any cross‑state trend view [3]. Even non‑revenue competitive indicators update on mismatched schedules (Indiana license lists near real‑time vs North Dakota annually), introducing timing noise into deployment trend analysis [4]. Example: $4.91 billion is Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gaming gross receipts, reported on an annual basis in the MGCB annual report, not as quarterly series [5]. For prediction markets, regulatory status can change on timelines of days to weeks, so the tracker updates weekly, underscoring cadence sensitivity in longitudinal analysis [6].

That isn't covered in the materials I've been given, so I can't answer it. The parts I couldn't find are listed below.

3 reporting cadences — annual in Minnesota, quarterly in Indiana, and monthly in New Hampshire — are used by their publishing agencies, so as‑of periods differ by design across states [1]. 1 rule applied in this work is to use only final audited figures where available, which reduces revision noise but ties each series to its own publication schedule [2][1]. 0 single national charitable‑gaming total exists in primary sources, so cross‑state trend work is constrained to state‑level filings rather than a stitched national series [3]. 7 states have primary‑source revenue data in this research as of September 21, 2026, and jurisdictions outside this set are tracked via license lists or excluded from revenue rollups, limiting comparability to the publishing states [3]. 2 different license‑list cadences — near real‑time in Indiana and annual in North Dakota — create timing mismatches for deployment and competitive inferences that rely on contemporaneous alignment [2]. Weekly tracker updates are used for prediction markets because state actions can change within days to weeks, so figures accurate on one date may be superseded quickly without tight date control [4]. More than a dozen states had taken enforcement or legislative action as of September 21, 2026, underscoring that rapid regulatory shifts can disrupt comparability across time if alignment is loose [5].

3 reporting cadences — annual (Minnesota), quarterly (Indiana), and monthly/H1 (New Hampshire) — are used by the publishing agencies, so as‑of dates rarely align across jurisdictions [1]. 4.91 billion is Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gambling gross receipts, an annual measured figure with a defined fiscal year, which cannot indicate within‑year seasonality without aligning to shorter periods elsewhere [2][1]. 0 national total is available from a single source, so cross‑state seasonal rollups require stitching together state filings with different periods and cutoffs, limiting accuracy if periods are not matched exactly [3][1]. Some states do not break out electronic formats or lack centralized reporting; in those cases no revenue figure is included, which removes jurisdictions from any seasonal comparison and biases the cross‑state trend line toward the states that do publish [4]. Where an agency publishes both an estimate and a final audited figure, only the final is used; mixing preliminary and final across states would add timing noise to a seasonal analysis [5][1][2]. In prediction markets, the regulatory picture can change on a timeline of days to weeks, so figures accurate as of one date may be superseded quickly, further complicating cross‑jurisdiction seasonal reads without tight date control [6].

0 — Total US charitable gaming revenue is not available from a single national source; this research uses measured state filings for Minnesota, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Kentucky, and Maryland, and does not roll in other jurisdictions [1]. 1 — Tribal gaming is entirely outside this research’s scope; tribal electronic operations are regulated by compacts and reported to the National Indian Gaming Commission under a separate framework, which publishes only annual gross gaming revenue at regional aggregates, not by product type or operator [2][3]. 2 — Where tribal e‑tab or electronic bingo exists alongside commercial charitable gaming, those tribal figures are not tracked here and are absent from the state totals used in this session [2][3]. 3 — National estimates found in trade press often blend measured state filings with tribal figures reported under a different framework; those blended totals are not included in this session’s figures [1]. 4 — Where states lack granular e‑tab reporting or centralized reporting, this research withholds a figure rather than substitute an estimate, further limiting any composite comparison [2].

That isn't covered in the materials I've been given, so I can't answer it. The parts I couldn't find are listed below.

0 — There is no single national charitable‑gaming total in primary sources as of September 21, 2026, so cross‑state comparisons start from separate state series rather than a unified dataset [1]. 3 — Agencies publish on different cadences: annual in Minnesota via the MGCB, quarterly in Indiana via the IGC, and monthly/H1 in New Hampshire via the Lottery Commission, creating non‑aligned as‑of dates across states [2]. 4.91 billion — Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gambling gross receipts are an annual measured total that includes e‑tabs among other formats (as of the FY2025 report) [3]. 75.6 million — Indiana’s e‑tab gross receipts for Q1 2026 come from a quarterly filing that also reports 2,562 machines at 509 locations (as of Q1 2026) [4]. 251.7 million — New Hampshire’s H1 2026 total revenue is reported on a monthly/H1 basis, with video lottery terminals at 52% of revenue (as of H1 2026) [4]. Gaps — Some states don’t break out e‑tabs or lack centralized reporting; in those cases no revenue figure is included rather than substituting an estimate (as of September 2026) [5]. Tribal e‑tab/e‑bingo is outside scope and only reported by NIGC as regional aggregates, not by product (as of September 2026) [5].

0 — There is no single national charitable‑gaming total in primary sources, so any “national” model must be built from heterogeneous state series rather than a unified dataset [1]. 3 cadences — annual (Minnesota), quarterly (Indiana), and monthly/H1 (New Hampshire) — mean as‑of dates do not line up, forcing alignment choices that can change model outputs [2]. Several states either do not break out electronic formats, do not require centralized reporting, or publish only license lists; in those cases this research includes no revenue figure and does not substitute an estimate, creating systematic gaps for model training and validation [3]. Tribal electronic operations are outside scope and the NIGC publishes only regional aggregates without product‑type breakouts, so tribal e‑tab/e‑bingo cannot be integrated into a product‑level national series from primary sources [3][4]. Trade estimates that appear in the press often combine measured state filings with extrapolations and tribal figures reported under a different framework, producing inputs that are not directly comparable to the state filings used here [1]. As a result, any national roll‑up based solely on primary sources is necessarily limited to the reporting states identified in coverage [1].

That isn't covered in the materials I've been given, so I can't answer it. The parts I couldn't find are listed below.

1 — There is no single national charitable‑gaming total in primary sources, and trade estimates often blend measured state filings with tribal figures reported under a different framework, which prevents a unified national time series from primary sources alone [1]. 2 — Tribal gaming is outside this research’s scope; tribal electronic pull‑tab and electronic bingo operations are not tracked here [2][3]. 3 — The National Indian Gaming Commission publishes annual gross gaming revenue only at aggregate regional levels, not by product type or operator, so tribal e‑tab/e‑bingo cannot be isolated for integration into state charitable‑gaming series [2]. 4 — Because state charitable‑gaming figures in this research come solely from licensing‑authority filings, any national roll‑up derived from them excludes tribal casino activity by design [4][2]. 5 — As a result, national charitable‑gaming trend modeling here must be limited to the states with mandatory, granular reporting and cannot incorporate tribal electronic formats [1][4]. 6 — Mixing tribal aggregates with state charitable‑gaming filings would combine incommensurate datasets and can misstate scope if sources and as‑of dates are not clearly separated [1].

31 billion — Kalshi’s June 2026 platform‑reported monthly trading volume appeared via Finance Magnates, providing near‑real‑time global activity signals that are outside regulator filings [1][2]. 156 million — Robinhood’s Rothera Exchange reported US event‑contract revenue on a quarterly earnings cadence for Q2 2026, which is authoritative but slower and periodic [1][3]. Days to weeks — the prediction‑market regulatory picture changes on days‑to‑weeks timelines, so any cross‑jurisdiction comparison built from last month’s filings can be stale quickly unless timing is aligned explicitly [4]. Global vs US — Polymarket’s disclosed trading volume is a global platform figure, while its US entity (QCX LLC) is subject to CFTC reporting post‑Nov 25, 2025; those platform volumes are not directly comparable to US‑only CFTC‑tied figures [5]. Source type split — for prediction markets, the primary regulatory sources are CFTC press releases, DCM application records, and court dockets, whereas revenue figures for listed platforms come from company disclosures or financial publications, creating different cadences by design [2]. Net effect — mixing fast global platform volumes with slower, US‑bounded mandated disclosures reduces the reliability of cross‑jurisdiction revenue comparisons unless jurisdiction, source type, and as‑of date are matched [5][4][2].

Coverage: where a state authorizes e‑tabs but does not publish revenue centrally, or publishes only totals without an electronic breakout, this research includes no number for that state and does not substitute an estimate, so cross‑state comparisons exclude those jurisdictions [1]. Comparability: states with centralized filings (e.g., Minnesota annual, Indiana quarterly, New Hampshire monthly/H1) can be compared to each other on a measured basis, but they cannot be directly compared to states that publish only license lists or non‑segmented totals, because the underlying product mix and reporting granularity are missing in those states [2][1]. Cadence: even among reporting states, differing release cycles (annual vs quarterly vs monthly) require careful period alignment; where a state lacks centralized reporting entirely, no defensible alignment is possible, which prevents inclusion in any measured roll‑up and contributes to the absence of a single national total from primary sources [2][3].

0 — There is no single national charitable‑gaming total in primary sources, so classification and roll‑ups are defined at the state level in the filings that exist [1]. 3 categories of sources — state regulatory filings, public‑company disclosures, and license lists — drive how revenue is labeled and segmented in this research, with state filings the authoritative basis for revenue classification [2]. 2 formats — electronic bingo and electronic pull tabs — are distinct product categories with different licensing and tracking requirements, and some states authorize one without the other, which leads to different revenue buckets by state [3]. $4.91 billion — Minnesota’s FY2025 gross receipts include multiple game types; the MGCB tracks bingo separately from pull‑tab receipts, and e‑tabs are the dominant share, so Minnesota’s filings classify revenue by product within a single annual total [4]. $75.6 million — Indiana’s Q1 2026 e‑tab gross receipts are reported alongside machine and site counts in a quarterly cadence, which yields format‑specific revenue classification tied to devices and locations [2][5]. $251.7 million and 52% — New Hampshire’s H1 2026 total and the share from video lottery terminals show a taxonomy that uses VLTs as a category, shifting the mix away from paper pull tabs in that state’s reports [5]. CEIB — Maryland’s charitable electronic bingo is administered by the MLGCC, with revenue reported through its licensing system and a July 1, 2026 card‑limit change that frames CEIB as a distinct electronic‑bingo revenue class [3]. Gap — Some states do not break out electronic formats, lack central reporting, or publish only license lists, so revenue cannot be classified consistently across all jurisdictions in primary sources [6].

0 — There is no single national charitable gaming total in the primary sources; assessment must be built from state filings rather than a unified series [1]. 7 — This research has measured revenue data from seven states (MN, IN, NH, ND, OH, KY, MD), so any national roll‑up restricted to these will omit jurisdictions without usable filings [1]. $4.91 billion — Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gambling gross receipts illustrate the scale that can be captured where filings are comprehensive and annualized [2]. $75.6 million — Indiana’s Q1 2026 e‑tab gross receipts show how quarterly cadence and format‑specific breakouts enable precise but partial aggregation [3]. $251.7 million and 52% — New Hampshire’s H1 2026 total and format mix show that states differ in how they segment revenue, complicating cross‑state alignment by product type [3]. Gap — Some states do not break out electronic formats or publish only license lists, so no figure is included and no estimate is substituted, which drives undercounting at a national level [4]. Exclusion — Tribal electronic gaming is outside scope and NIGC reports only regional aggregates without product‑type detail, further preventing a true national total [4]. Practice — Trade‑press “national” numbers often mix measured filings with extrapolations, whereas this work labels estimates and relies on filed figures, limiting national aggregation but improving defensibility [1][5].

3 cadences — Minnesota reports annually, Indiana quarterly, and New Hampshire monthly — so figures carry different as-of periods by design [1]. Where an agency issues both an estimate and a final audited figure, this work uses only the final, which fixes the as-of date to that agency’s publication cycle [1][2]. States that do not break out electronic formats or lack centralized reporting are excluded rather than estimated, so seasonal comparisons are limited to jurisdictions with usable, filed series and aligned breakouts [3]. Manufacturer and distributor license lists also update on differing schedules (near real-time in Indiana vs annually in North Dakota), reinforcing cross-state timing mismatches in competitive views tied to deployment cadence [4]. Total US charitable gaming revenue is not available from a single national source, so seasonal views are presented at the state level using those agencies’ own periods rather than a stitched national series [5]. Every cited figure is sourced to a primary filing with its stated as-of date to keep comparisons anchored to what was actually filed [2][1].

0 — There is no single national charitable gaming total in primary sources, so any national trend must stitch together heterogeneous state filings instead of a unified series [1]. 3 cadences — annual (Minnesota), quarterly (Indiana), and monthly/H1 (New Hampshire) — create as‑of misalignments that complicate period‑over‑period national comparisons unless time windows are carefully aligned or interpolated [2]. Several states either do not break out electronic formats, lack centralized reporting, or publish only license lists without revenue; in this research those jurisdictions are excluded rather than estimated, which constrains national trendlines to reporting states and leaves real gaps [3][1]. Tribal electronic gaming is outside scope and the NIGC publishes only regional aggregates without product‑type breakouts, preventing integration of tribal e‑tab/e‑bingo into national series [3]. By policy, only final audited figures are used and any constructed roll‑ups must be labeled as estimates, which improves defensibility but limits the ability to present seamless national time series when filings differ in format and cadence [2][4][1].

3 cadences — annual (e.g., Minnesota), quarterly (Indiana), and monthly/H1 (New Hampshire) — are used by the publishing agencies, so as‑of dates rarely line up across states [1]. 4.91 billion is Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gambling gross receipts, an annual measured total with a defined fiscal year, which is not directly comparable to a single quarter without aligning periods [2]. 75.6 million is Indiana’s e‑tab gross receipts for Q1 2026, a quarterly measured figure that reflects only that quarter’s activity and cadence [3]. 251.7 million is New Hampshire’s total charitable gaming revenue for H1 2026, reported on a monthly/H1 basis, again with a distinct as‑of date and period [3]. Where an agency publishes both an estimate and a final audited figure, only the final is used, which improves comparability when periods match but limits mixing preliminary and final data across states [1][4]. There is no single national charitable‑gaming total, so jurisdiction‑level filings are presented with their own as‑of dates rather than rolled up into a composite that would blend periods [5]. Some states do not break out electronic formats or lack centralized reporting; in those cases no revenue figure is included, preventing like‑for‑like e‑tab comparisons even when dates could be aligned [6].

1 — November 25, 2025 is when Polymarket’s US entity (QCX LLC) received a CFTC Amended Order of Designation; after that, its US operations are subject to regulatory reporting requirements, which appear via CFTC press releases and designation/enforcement records rather than routine revenue line items [1][2][3]. 2 — Polymarket’s widely cited trading volumes are platform disclosures covering its global activity, not mandatory CFTC filings, and they are not directly comparable to US‑only totals tied to CFTC‑licensed reporting [1]. Weekly — the regulatory picture changes on days‑to‑weeks timelines, so trackers update weekly and date entries; this reflects that CFTC‑related transparency is episodic, while platform or financial‑press revenue disclosures can appear faster [4][2]. Scope — CFTC materials focus on authorization and enforcement (e.g., designations, emergency orders), providing standardized, jurisdiction‑bounded status, whereas platform volume figures provide rapid activity signals but mix offshore and US activity, reducing comparability to regulator‑tied US disclosures [1][2][5]. December 3, 2025 — Polymarket relaunched for US customers after the designation, reinforcing the distinction between its US‑regulated operations and global platform reporting [3].

Three cadences — annual, quarterly, and monthly — are typical for state charitable‑gaming reports, and they publish granular operational and revenue metrics such as gross receipts, machine counts, and site counts (e.g., Indiana’s quarterly reports) [1]. One cadence — episodic — characterizes prediction‑market regulatory materials, which are mainly CFTC press releases, DCM application records, and court dockets focused on authorization and enforcement, not routine revenue line items [2]. $4.91 billion Minnesota FY totals, quarterly Indiana breakouts with machine and site counts, and monthly New Hampshire figures exemplify measured, recurring jurisdiction‑level revenue reporting that can be compared across periods within a state [1]. Zero recurring revenue fields appear in typical CFTC press releases or court dockets; when revenue is cited for prediction markets, it generally comes from platform disclosures or financial‑press reporting rather than regulator filings [2]. Global vs US — Polymarket’s widely cited trading volumes are platform figures covering global activity and are not directly comparable to US‑only, regulator‑tied disclosures, underscoring lower regulatory granularity on revenue for prediction markets [3]. Days‑to‑weeks — state actions and litigation shift quickly, so tracker updates are weekly, reflecting that prediction‑market regulatory transparency is episodic and less granular on economics than state charitable‑gaming filings [4][5].

Two — manufacturer disclosures are one of three primary-source categories tracked alongside state regulatory filings and license lists, but state filings are the most authoritative for revenue and are the sole basis for the revenue figures used here [1]. Zero — manufacturer disclosures do not replace missing state revenue: where a state does not publish e‑tab revenue in a usable form, this research includes no figure and does not substitute an estimate from manufacturers [2]. One — when a number requires calculation beyond what a filing states, it is labeled an estimate; using manufacturer data to infer revenue (e.g., via units or market share) would therefore be an estimate rather than a measured figure [3]. Two — trade‑press “national” totals often blend measured filings with extrapolations (sometimes including tribal figures), illustrating why manufacturer-derived roll‑ups must be clearly labeled as estimates to avoid overstating accuracy [4]. $4.91 billion and $75.6 million — these measured baselines from Minnesota FY2025 and Indiana Q1 2026 come directly from regulators and exemplify the filings that anchor state‑level accuracy in this work [3][5]. Three — manufacturer and distributor license lists (e.g., Ohio’s +E endorsements; ND’s annual list) help identify active suppliers and scope, but they are not revenue data and are not used as revenue substitutes [4][6]. Finally, where agencies publish both preliminary estimates and finals, only final audited figures are used, further prioritizing filing accuracy over any derived manufacturer-based estimates [1][3].

0 — There is no single national charitable gaming total in the primary sources, so any national figure must start from state‑level measured filings rather than a composite that blends estimates with unknowns [1]. 7 — The states with primary‑source revenue data in this research are Minnesota, Indiana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Kentucky, and Maryland, providing multiple anchor jurisdictions for any roll‑up attempt [1]. Measured filings from state regulators are the most authoritative inputs, such as Minnesota’s FY2025 gross receipts of $4.91 billion from the MGCB annual report, and should be used as filed baselines with clear as‑of dates [2][3]. Indiana’s quarterly e‑tab filings (e.g., $75.6 million in Q1 2026; 2,562 machines; 509 sites) add machine and site granularity that can constrain assumptions when building higher‑level estimates [4]. Manufacturer disclosures from public companies are a separate primary source category that can corroborate or bound state totals but must be labeled distinctly from regulator filings [2]. Any constructed national estimate must be labeled as an estimate and not presented as a filed figure, per the measured‑versus‑estimated standard [5]. Where states do not publish granular electronic formats, or where operations (e.g., tribal e‑tab) are outside these disclosures, this research does not substitute estimates, and those gaps should remain explicit in any national figure [6]. Trade‑press national numbers often blend measured filings with extrapolations, so improving accuracy means anchoring on filed state data and clearly marking any derived components [1][5].

$251.7 million — that is New Hampshire’s total charitable gaming revenue for H1 2026, a measured figure from the New Hampshire Lottery Commission, and it is used in this research strictly as a state‑level, filed baseline with an as‑of period, not as an input to cross‑state projections [1][2]. 52% — video lottery terminals accounted for 52% of New Hampshire’s H1 2026 charitable gaming revenue; this format split is treated as a measured in‑state indicator rather than extrapolated to other jurisdictions in this work [1][3]. This research relies only on primary regulatory filings and audited disclosures, and where an agency publishes both estimates and finals, only the final figure is used; no constructed cross‑state estimates are substituted [2][3]. Where adjacent states do not publish granular electronic formats or centralized revenue, no figure is included and no extrapolation from New Hampshire is made [4][5]. Total US charitable gaming revenue is not available from a single national source, so state‑level reporting (including New Hampshire) is presented individually rather than rolled into modeled regional totals [5][2].

Days-to-weeks — regulatory status shifts on days-to-weeks timelines, so any estimate built from last month’s filings can be stale quickly; our tracker updates weekly for this reason (as of September 2026) [1]. $31 billion — platform and media-reported monthly trading volume like Kalshi’s June 2026 total appears quickly via Finance Magnates, giving timely activity signals that precede or sit outside regulator filings focused on authorization and enforcement, not near-real-time revenue [2][3]. $156 million — by contrast, Robinhood’s Rothera Exchange reports event contract revenue on a quarterly earnings cadence, which is authoritative but slower and periodic, affecting the temporal precision of estimates tied to filings alone [2]. Global vs US — Polymarket’s public volume is a global platform disclosure, not a US-only regulatory figure; using it to estimate US revenue without adjustment reduces accuracy and comparability to CFTC-tied reporting (US entity designated Nov 25, 2025) [4]. Net effect — mixing fast, global platform metrics with slower, jurisdiction-bounded filings increases error in revenue estimates unless sources, as-of dates, and jurisdictional scope are aligned explicitly (as practiced in our coverage) [3][1][4].

52% — in New Hampshire, video lottery terminals accounted for 52 percent of total charitable gaming revenue in H1 2026, displacing traditional paper pull tabs as the dominant format; this is a measured figure from the New Hampshire Lottery Commission’s H1 2026 release [1]. $251.7 million — that is New Hampshire’s total charitable gaming revenue for H1 2026, up 37% year over year, per the same measured release [1]. These figures come from state regulatory filings that the New Hampshire Lottery publishes on a monthly cadence and are the sole basis for this research’s revenue statements; no estimates are substituted for missing data [2].

3 reporting cadences — annual, quarterly, and monthly — are used by the agencies that publish charitable‑gaming figures; Minnesota reports annually, Indiana quarterly, and New Hampshire monthly/H1, each with stated as‑of dates [1]. $4.91 billion is Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gambling gross receipts, an annual measured total from the Minnesota Gambling Control Board (as of FY2025) [2]. $75.6 million is Indiana e‑tab gross receipts for Q1 2026 from the Indiana Gaming Commission’s quarterly report (as of Q1 2026) [3]. $251.7 million is New Hampshire’s total charitable gaming revenue for H1 2026 from the New Hampshire Lottery Commission (as of H1 2026) [3]. Measured figures are defined as filings or audited statements with a stated as‑of date, and this distinction is emphasized precisely because it affects how a figure can be defended and compared [4]. Where states lack granular electronic breakouts or centralized reporting, this research withholds figures, limiting cross‑state coverage to jurisdictions with publishable filings rather than substituting estimates [5][6]. There is no single national charitable‑gaming total in primary sources, so jurisdiction‑level filings are presented with their own as‑of dates [6].

Two impacts, both material: 1) Comparisons that mix measured filings with constructed estimates are less reliable because the estimate’s denominator or inference is not filed and must be defended by assumptions, not documents [1]. 2) Cross‑state comparisons based only on measured filings will be incomplete where states don’t publish granular electronic formats or any centralized revenue, so the sample of states you can compare is narrower than the actual market footprint [2][3].

Measured figures (e.g., Minnesota’s FY2025 $4.91 billion gross receipts from the MGCB annual report) can be tied to a specific document, period, and jurisdiction, which improves comparability when another state publishes equivalent filings [4][5]. Where a state reports totals without breaking out e‑tabs, or authorizes play without centralized reporting, no measured e‑tab figure exists, blocking like‑for‑like comparisons and preventing defensible roll‑ups [2][3]. National totals often seen in trade press blend measured filings with extrapolations or tribal numbers reported under a different framework, which are out of scope here and reduce cross‑state comparability when categories are mixed [3][2]. Methodologically, this research uses only final agency filings and withholds figures rather than substitute estimates, trading breadth for reliability [5][2].

That isn't covered in the materials I've been given, so I can't answer it. The parts I couldn't find are listed below.

That isn't covered in the materials I've been given, so I can't answer it. The parts I couldn't find are listed below.

1 — Tribal gaming revenue is reported under a separate framework to the National Indian Gaming Commission, which publishes annual gross gaming revenue by region and not by product type or operator [1]. 2 — Accordingly, tribal electronic pull‑tab or electronic bingo operations are outside this research and are not captured in the state charitable‑gaming filings that are the sole basis for the measured figures presented here [1][2]. 3 — This means state‑level charitable gaming totals drawn from licensing authorities reflect only state‑regulated operations and exclude any tribal casino revenue within the same state [2][1]. 4 — The absence of tribal data is identified as a material gap significant enough to name explicitly in the coverage notes [1]. 5 — Separately, some states either do not break out electronic formats or lack centralized reporting; in those cases this research withholds a revenue figure rather than substitute an estimate, further limiting state‑level completeness for electronic formats [1]. 6 — Because there is no single national charitable‑gaming total and trade estimates often blend measured filings with extrapolations or tribal figures reported under a different framework, mixing categories can misstate scope if the source and as‑of date are not clear [3].

1 — Polymarket’s US entity received a CFTC Amended Order of Designation on November 25, 2025; after that, its US operations are subject to regulatory reporting, whereas the trading volume Polymarket publicizes represents its global platform and is a platform disclosure, not a mandatory CFTC filing [1]. 5 — As of September 2026, five platforms hold active authorization to offer event contracts to US retail customers, so comparable US‑regulated disclosures exist across multiple venues, but platform‑reported figures can mix global and US activity, reducing comparability to filings tied to US operations [2][1]. $31 billion — Kalshi’s June 2026 monthly trading volume was reported by Finance Magnates, illustrating that some high‑velocity platform metrics appear first in media or company channels rather than in regulator filings, which prioritize authorization and enforcement records over near‑real‑time volumes [3][4]. Weekly — because legal status can change on days‑to‑weeks timelines, Gaming Market Research updates its tracker weekly and dates entries, reflecting that regulatory transparency is episodic while platform disclosures can be continuous and fast [5]. In short: platform numbers are timely and global; regulatory materials are jurisdiction‑bounded, standardized, and more comparable for US activity, but arrive on regulatory cadences [1][4].

$4.91 billion — that is Minnesota’s FY2025 charitable gambling gross receipts, a measured figure from the Minnesota Gambling Control Board’s annual report as of FY2025 [1][2]. $75.6 million — that is Indiana’s e‑tab gross receipts for Q1 2026, a measured quarterly filing from the Indiana Gaming Commission with 2,562 machines at 509 locations, as reported in Q1 2026 [3][4]. $251.7 million — that is New Hampshire’s total charitable gaming revenue for H1 2026, a measured figure from the New Hampshire Lottery Commission, with video lottery terminals comprising 52% in that period [3]. My materials contain no estimated figures for Indiana or New Hampshire; this research uses state regulatory filings for revenue and does not substitute estimates where data are partial or unpublished [4][5]. Where jurisdictions lack granular publications, the work excludes those revenue figures rather than estimate them, so a comparison between Minnesota’s measured total and “estimated” figures for Indiana or New Hampshire is not available here [5][6]. National roll‑ups seen in trade press often blend measured filings with extrapolations, but this session presents state‑level measured totals only, with sources and as‑of dates [6][1].